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Abstract
This paper investigates the impacts of firm technology choice on cross-country variations in
gender gaps—particularly those variations in the wages and time devoted to home production.
For this purpose, we construct a general equilibrium model that includes firm technology choice
and home production. The numerical results reveal that the cross-country variations in both the
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1 Introduction
Despite the enactment of equal pay acts, equal opportunity laws, and the progress made by females
in terms of higher-education, substantial variations remain in the gender gaps of wage rates and
time spent for home production—even in developed countries. What causes these differences in both
the wage and time gender gaps across countries? Is there a unique mechanism that will explain the
variations in both wage and time gender gaps?
This paper investigates the cross-country variation of the gender wage gap (hereafter wage gap)
and the home production time gap (hereafter time gap) among a sample of eight industrialized
nations.1 We focus on home production hours—in contradistinction to focus on market work hours
by many studies, such as Olovsson (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008), and McDaniel (2011)—because
home production is more volatile than market hours between countries. In addition, recent studies
emphasize the importance of the relationship between market work and home production when
comparing cross-country differences in time usage.2 However, to our knowledge, no study has yet
provided a cross-country analysis of the time gap.
Meanwhile, since the mid-to-late 20th century, an increase in the female labor supply has been
observed in many countries, and this trend will likely continue. Many developed countries are
promoting the participation of females in the labor market to achieve work-life balance and to
address the effects of the declining birthrate and an aging society. Changing the female relative
labor supply can lead to technological and institutional change that is more appropriate to female
workers, e.g., directed technical change a` la Acemoglu (2002). If labor market institutions become
equalized among countries, what happens to the wage gap and the time gap?
To answer these questions, we first construct a general equilibrium model of the gender wage
gap with firms technology choice and home production of households consisting of two different
marital statuses: single and couple. Firms can choose their production technologies and labor
inputs. Depending on the factor abundance and relative cost of choosing different technologies,
firms’ technologies can be biased toward either males or females, which results in the wage gap.
We call these technologies “gender-biased technology”. The term “technology” in this context can
be broadly interpreted to include labor market institutions, corporate culture, personnel allocation,
employment regulations, and social norms that affect worker productivity.
Gender-biased technology also implicitly represents the degree of unequal treatment between
male and female in an intra-firm and inter-firm labor market. Employee benefits such as parental
1These countries consist of Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and
the United States (U.S.).
2 Prescott (2004) stresses the role of cross-country differences in tax rates to explain the difference in market hours
worked between U.S. and European countries using a simple neoclassical framework without home production. Later,
Rogerson (2009) subsequently reports that home production drastically changes the relationship between taxes and
market hours worked.
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leave, could be an example of technology chosen by firms that would encourage female workers
to stay working in such firms after certain life events. When the female labor supply increases
or more equal treatment of the genders is realized, firms would choose female-biased technology
because it is more profitable for firms to employ abundant labor factors. However, there is some
empirical evidence of unequal treatment for females even in the intra-firm context, e.g., Pfeifer
and Sohr (2009), Gupta and Rothstein (2005), and Meyersson-Milgrom et al. (2001); these studies
show that a distribution across job levels for female workers is strongly biased toward lower levels,
and a large part of the gender wage gap can be explained by segregating males and females in
different hierarchical levels and controlling for human capital differences. To capture these unequal
treatments at the macro level, we assume unequal treatment in types of technologies that include
institutions and rules, a´ la economic growth literature. Because it is difficult to take unequal
treatment variables at the macro level and there are many unobserved factors that affect the working
environment, we employ a strategy that is a standard quantitative analysis that uses the economic
growth model. The total factor productivity (TFP) can capture these effects instead and explicitly
include such a variable.
After constructing the model, we then calibrate the parameters such that the equilibrium
matches the data under the calibrated parameters. With the exception of technology choice, the
specification of the model follows the standard model in the literature and also focuses on the
plainest form to facilitate interpretation. Given the limited availability of time use data, The ad-
vantages of this strategy are that we can still identify all the relevant parameters, particularly for
home production; in addition, we can still identify the impacts of firm technology choice on gender
gaps, which is our main interest and is clearly defined compared with other possible sources of
gender gaps that have multiple interpretations due to our calibration strategy.
The model is an application of Caselli and Coleman’s (2006) framework to the context of the
gender gap context. The Caselli and Coleman (2006) model provides that firms can choose input-
specific productivities to maximize profits, in addition to a standard choice of the levels of two
production inputs, skilled and unskilled workers. As a result, the skill premium reflects the relative
abundance of skilled workers, and these authors show that an important fraction of the cross-country
differences in income per worker can be explained by this technology choice. Here, we treat the
gender gaps instead of the skill premium. Specifically, firms distinguish male and female labor
and choose gender-specific productivities as well as labor inputs to maximize profits.3 Therefore,
given our view that technology includes institutions, institutions are endogenous variables and
3 The assumption that firms distinguish male and female labor is supported by the previous literature, which
suggests that the elasticity of substitution between males and females in market activities ranges from two to three
(Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2011). Although this result might reflect differences in the skill composition between male
and female, the empirical studies discussed in the text support our modeling, i.e., firms distinguish male and female
even when they have equal educational and/or skill levels.
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are affected by the relative supply of each production input. We also note that there is also an
exogenous friction—introduced as the relative cost of choosing technologies—that constraints firms
technology choice. For example, the relative cost is affected by the degree of a taste discrimination
and the higher quit rates of females due to childbearing. The general equilibrium approach then
generates rich interactions between the wage and time gaps that are frequently neglected in the
labor economics literature.
Given this approach, we restate the previous questions as follows: What are the impacts of firm
technology choice on the cross-country variation in the observed gender differences in wage and
time allocation. Are the sources of the variations the same for both the wage and time gaps? To
answer these questions, we conduct counterfactual simulations that compare equilibria under appro-
priate and inappropriate technology choice in which firms can and cannot choose their technology
depending on their environments, respectively.
The main finding is that technology choice has considerable impacts on the cross-country varia-
tions in not just the wage gap but also the time gaps of both households consisting of a single person
(single households) and households consisting of one male and one female (couple households) in
the sense that the observed cross-country variation in technology can significantly affect the equi-
libria of countries and therefore their gender gaps. Not surprisingly, technology choice reproduces
a non-negligible part of the observed cross-country variation in the wage gap, which is also true for
the time gap of single households. However, there is a different result for the time gap for couple
households. That is, for the couple time gap, technology choice contributes to a reduction in the
cross-country variation, mainly because an important part of the observed cross-country variation in
the couple time gap is due to the cross-country variation in the factors related to home production,
and the effect of these variations and that of technology choice on the cross-country variation offset
each other.
Two policy implications are drawn from these results: The first is that there are major difficulties
in narrowing gender gaps. This difficulty arises from the fact that these gaps arise largely from
technology choice; this term is broadly interpreted to include labor market institutions, corporate
culture, and social norms, which are all difficult to change dramatically. The second is that global
policy coordination that aims to narrow these gender gaps by affecting firms’ technology choices,
even if they succeed in altering firms’ behavior and shrinking the differences in technology choice
across countries, might not result in smaller gender gaps for all measures. Instead, while achieving
smaller gaps in the wage and time gaps of single households, such a policy is associated with a
widened cross-country variation in the time gap of the couple households, i.e., in some countries,
the couple time gap might shrink; however, other countries might experience a larger time gap.
There are some empirical studies that conduct an international comparison of the gender wage
gap, e.g., Blau and Kahn (1992, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 2003) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008,
2011). In labor economics, institutions are one of the main topics comprehensively reviewed in Blau
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and Kahn (1999), Nickell and Layard (1999) and Boeri (2011). Blau and Kahn also argue that
institutions have an explanatory power of cross-country differences of the wage gap. However, due
to their approach based on the traditional reduced form regression, they evaluate partial equilibrium
effects. We overcome this limitation by using a general equilibrium model that is able to assess the
indirect effects of changing equilibria. Another difference between our studies is that we assume
endogenous institutions that are included in total factor productivity such as the economic growth
model, e.g., Jones and Romer (2010), whereas Blau and Kahn treat only the observed exogenous
effects of institution, e.g., parental leave and the degree of occupational segregation by gender.
The treatments we employ can assess certain unobserved technological and institutional effects of
productivities.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We first describe our model in Section 2. Then,
we calibrate the model and quantify the effects of firm technology choice on the cross-country
variations in the gender wage and time gaps for a benchmark case in Section 3, which is followed
by a robustness analysis in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 The Model
We consider a closed economy with no capital stock.4 The economic agents consist of firms, house-
holds and the government. Households are further divided into two groups: single and couple. In
addition to the production activities of firms, home production occurs in each type of household.
The government conducts an income redistribution policy only. All markets are competitive.
2.1 Firms
Competitive firms employ male labor Lm and female labor Lf , which are measured in terms of
efficiency units. The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) and is specified
by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form:
Y = [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ , σ < 1, (1)
where Y is the output, As is sex-s labor-augmenting technology, and σ determines the elasticity of
substitution (1/(1−σ)) between male and female labor. This general form of the production function
is used to account for the literature. The number of empirical studies on the elasticity of substitution
is small; however, these studies consistently suggest that the elasticity of substitution ranges from
two to three (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2011). Although this result might reflect the difference in
the gender composition of the skill level between male and female, there is yet another rationale for
firms to distinguish male and female labor-even when the skill levels are equal. Certain previous
studies show that a distribution across job levels for female workers is strongly biased toward the
4 In Section 4, this assumption is relaxed to perform robustness checks for our main results.
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lower level, and a large part of the gender wage gap can be explained by the segregation of males and
females in different hierarchical levels even after controlling for human capital differences (Pfeifer
and Sohr, 2009; Gupta and Rothstein, 2005; Meyersson-Milgrom et al., 2001).
Similar to Caselli and Coleman (2006), the model differs from the standard model in that firms
choose their own appropriate technology levels, i.e., (Am, Af ):
Aωm + υA
ω
f ≤ B, (2)
where ω, υ and B are all positive parameters. B is interpreted as the inverse measure of the
barrier to the world technology frontier, which means a subset of the production technologies of
the most technologically advanced country, the country with the highest B. The combination of ω
and υ governs the curvature of the country-specific technology frontier defined by the pair (Am, Af )
implied by equation (2) at equality. As B increases or the barrier diminishes, the technology frontier
expands and firms within a given country can access a wider subset of production technologies.
When Am/Af equals one, then equal treatment between genders is realize in the country, and the
gender wage gap is narrowed.
υ can be interpreted as the relative cost of shifting from the male to the female labor-augmenting
technology choice (hereafter relative cost), which reflects all sources of the gender gap in efficiency
wage rates other than relative labor abundance, Ls, of the labor of each sex s. Assume that
Lm = Lf . If υ = 1, then firms choose Am = Af , i.e., there is no gender wage gap. However, if
υ > 1, i.e., the relative cost is higher, firms choose the production technology such that Am > Af ,
which results in a gender wage gap. One possible interpretation of υ is sex discrimination (including
the “glass ceiling”).5 Lazear and Rosen (1990) note that females’ higher quit rates cost employers
with respect to training and promotions into higher positions.
Formally, the firms’ profit maximization problem is represented as the following:
max
{Ls, As}s∈{m,f}
{
[(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ − wmLm − wfLf
}
s.t. (2).
In addition to the typical marginal productivity conditions used to obtain the wage gap equation,
wmem
wfef
=
em
ef
(
Am
Af
)σ (Lm
Lf
)−(1−σ)
, (3)
5 Arrow (1971) criticizes exogenously specified discrimination and estimates that the free entry of firms will expel
prejudiced employers in the long run, and this decreasing trend in discrimination is estimated by Flabbi (2010).
However, we do still observe discrimination. O’Neill (2003) reports that approximately 42% of the male-female gap in
median earnings in 2000 could not be explained by gender differences in schooling, experience, and job characteristics.
In addition, discrimination captured by υ includes not only the employer prejudice discussed by Arrow (1971) and
Becker (1971) among others, but also the asymmetric effects of policies. Furthermore, the degree and speed of decrease
in discrimination might differ across countries, which provides us a rationale for conducting a cross-country analysis
in Section 3.
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assuming a condition, ω > σ/(1 − σ), for a unique interior solution to the technology choice as in
Caselli and Coleman (2006),6 we also have the optimality conditions for technology choice consoli-
dated as
Am
Af
= υ
1
ω−σ
(
Lm
Lf
) σ
ω−σ
, (4)
which suggests that both endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages work in technology
choice. That is, the relative sex-s augmenting productivity is determined by the relative abundance
and relative cost of sex-s labor. Thus, the hourly wage gap, wmem/(wfef ), depends on firms’
technology choice, Am/Af , as well as the gender gap in skill es and decreasing returns to scale, the
latter of which is weakened by the technology choice as the result of the complementarity between
the technology choice and labor supply under the empirically valid case, i.e., σ/(ω − σ) > 0.
2.2 Households
Households are divided into single and couple households. Unlike single households, members in
each couple household can cooperate with one another with respect to their time allocation, which
implies that the elasticities of labor supply are different across these two different groups in general
(Jones et al., 2003). Thus, letting N∗s and N denote the measure of the single households of sex s
and that of the couple households, respectively, the total population N of the economy is given by
N = N∗m +N∗f + 2N , which is normalized to unity without loss of generality.7
2.2.1 Single Household
A sex-s single household considers home production as well as the standard consumption and time
allocation problem:8
max
c∗s , g∗, h∗M,s, h
∗
N,s≥0
{
α∗s ln(c
∗
s) + (1− α∗s)
(1− h∗M,s − h∗N,s)1−γ
∗
s − 1
1− γ∗s
}
6 Intuitively, this inequality states that the degree, ω/σ, of decreasing returns to scale in technology choice domi-
nates the degree, 1/(1− ρ), of the positive circular causation in technology choice, and there is thus no benefit from
perfect specialization, and the optimal technology choice becomes the interior solution. We verify that the inequality
actually holds given the result of our calibration.
7 In the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the measures (N,N∗m, N
∗
f ) under the assumption of this household
structure such that the model can match the ratio of the aggregate labor supply of each sex. Given this calibration
procedure and the fact that the real world includes households with memberships other than those specified in the
model, readers should not interpret the household consisting of a couple in the model literally. Instead, it should
be simply interpreted as merely a virtual representative of household members that can cooperate with one another.
Similarly, the single households should be interpreted as those without cooperation. In what follows, however, we use
the terms single and couple households for convenience.
8 The input structure of home production is the same as that in Becker (1965), who was followed by Olovsson
(2004), Ragan (2013), and Rogerson (2009), among others. For preference, we follow Gronau (1977) as in Chang and
Schorfheide (2003) and Rogerson (2009).
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s.t.
c∗s = Hs(g∗s , esh∗N,s) =
[
ξ∗sg
∗
s
η + (1− ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η
] 1
η , ξ∗s ∈ (0, 1), η < 1, (5)
(1 + τc)g∗s ≤ (1− τ`)wsesh∗M,s + T, (6)
h∗M,s + h
∗
N,s ≤ 1,
where c∗s is the consumption of home goods produced by means of a CRS technology Hs(g∗s , esh∗N,s)
with an elasticity of substitution of 1/(1− η), having inputs that consist of market goods, g∗s and,
effective home production hours, i.e., skill es times home production hour h∗N,s.
9 ξ∗s is the weight
of market goods in the home production of sex-s single households. Letting h∗M,s denote market
hours and normalizing the time endowment to unity, 1−h∗M,s−h∗N,s becomes the leisure time. τc is
the consumption tax, τ` is the labor income tax, T is the lump-sum transfer per person, ws is the
wage rate of sex s, α∗s is the share parameter for consumption, and γs is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of leisure (defined as the elasticity of leisure with respect to the wage rate holding the
marginal utility of consumption constant). 10
First-order conditions (FOCs) state that marginal utility from the hours for each activity balance
one another:11
α∗s
Hsg
Hs
1− τ`
1 + τc
wses = α∗s
HsNes
Hs ,
or
HsN
Hsg
=
1− ξ∗s
ξ∗s
(
g∗s
esh∗N,s
)(1−η)
=
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws, all s ∈ {m, f}, (7)
where Hsg ≡ ∂Hs/∂g∗s , and HsN ≡ ∂Hs/∂h∗N,s. The interpretation of the first equation above
is as follows. An additional market hour increases the labor income net of labor income tax by
(1 − τ`)wses, which is equivalent to (1 − τ`)/(1 + τc)wses units of market goods. Multiplying this
amount by marginal productivity, the Hsg of market goods in home production and marginal utility
of consumption α∗s/Hs, we obtain the left hand side (LHS), the marginal utility of an additional
market hour. The right hand side (RHS), the marginal utility of an additional home hour, follows
a similar reasoning.
9 The inclusion of skill es in the labor input is consistent with the arguments by Gronau(1980, 2008) that more
educated people are better at implementing their tasks. The assumption that efficiency in the home work is propor-
tional to that in market activities appears less important when investigating the time gap, which is related to the
ratio of efficiencies em/ef more than to the levels themselves because the difference across sexes with respect to the
impacts of education on home productivity are not decisive (Table 7 in Gronau and Hamermesh (2008)).
10Frisch elasticity is typically derived in relation to the intertemporal labor supply elasticity in dynamic models.
Although our model is static, the Frisch elasticity of leisure in our static framework is equivalent to that in dynamic
models in which the utility function specifies separate leisure and time function.
11 We are assuming that the zero lower bound of h∗M,s does not bind, which is the case of interest given that agents
within the same group of households are identical.
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Taking the ratio of each sex results in the effective time gap:
emh
∗
N,m
efh
∗
N,f
=
{
wm/[(1− ξ∗m)/ξ∗m]
wf/[(1− ξ∗f )/ξ∗f ]
}− 1
1−η g∗m
g∗f
. (8)
The ratio is decreasing in the ratio of the efficiency wage, ws, normalized by the relative weight
(1 − ξ∗s )/ξ∗s of home production due to the opportunity cost and increase in the ratio of market
goods g∗s due to complementarity. The elasticity of the ratio with respect to the former is precisely
the same as that between market goods and labor input in home production.
2.2.2 Couple Household
A typical couple household differs from a single household in that the budget constraint is consoli-
dated and that members in the household solve a common allocation problem:12
max
g, {cs, hM,s, hN,s,zs}s∈{m,f}≥0
 ∑
s∈{m,f}
αs ln(cs) + `(1− hM,m − hN,m, 1− hM,f − hN,f )
 (9)
s.t.∑
s∈{m,f}
cs = H(g, emhN,m, efhN,f )
=
{
ξgη + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
} 1
η
, ρ < 1, (10)
(1 + τc)g ≤ (1− τ`)
∑
s∈{m,f}
wseshM,s + 2T, (11)
hM,s + hN,s ≤ 1, all s ∈ {m, f}, (12)
where ` is a leisure function, which is strictly increasing, twice continuously differential and concave,
and H is the home production function for which the inputs consist of market goods and the
CRS composite of the time of both members with an elasticity of substitution of 1/(1 − ρ). The
crucial difference between the above problem and the single problem is that members of the couple
households can cooperate with one another by selecting their time allocation {hM,s, hN,s}s∈{m,f} for
given weights (zm, zf ), which we call zs home production effort, or simply effort, of sex s hereafter.
Effort is interpreted as human capital, the way in which members in a couple household cooperate
with one another, and other factors. Variables and parameters that have the same notation except
for an asterisk have the same meaning as for the single households. A household with two members
receives a lump-sum transfer of 2T .
Solving the allocation problem of the home goods, i.e., {cs}s∈{m,f}, we obtain the reduced-form
problem, of which the FOCs with respect to time allocation hold that marginal utility from hours
12 In this paper, we do not introduce any strategic behavior between members in the household. The input structure
of the home production function is a direct extension of the single household case to the case of couple households.
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to each activity balance one another as for single households:13
Hg
H
1− τ`
1 + τc
wses =
Hses
H , all s ∈ {m, f},
where Hg ≡ ∂H/∂g and Hs ≡ ∂H/∂(eshN,s), and the LHS and RHS are the marginal utilities of
an additional market and home hour, respectively.
Furthermore, taking the ratio of this equation for each sex s yields the effective time gap for the
couple households, which is similar to that for single households:
Hm
Hf =
zm
zf
(
emhN,m
efhN,f
)−(1−ρ)
=
wm
wf
, or
emhN,m
efhN,f
=
(
wm/zm
wf/zf
)− 1
1−ρ
, (13)
which states that the time gap depends on not only the efficiency wage gap representing the com-
parative advantage in market activities but also on the effort gap zm/zf , i.e., the comparative
advantage in the home production.
This result corresponds to (8) for single households, and the effort gap zm/zf is the counterpart
of the ratio of the relative weight (1 − ξ∗s )/ξ∗s . However, the crucial difference appears in the
elasticity of the time gap with respect to the relative efficiency wage gap. The absolute elasticity
of single households is equal to the elasticity of substitution (1/(1− η)) between market goods and
the time spent for home production, whereas that of the couple households is equal to the one
1/(1− ρ) between the male and female in home production. The cooperation between members in
a couple household makes the market goods g public goods, which is why the above equation has
no counterpart of g∗m/g∗f .
2.3 Government
The government levies consumption and proportional labor income taxes on households. The col-
lected revenues are then used for redistribution through the lump-sum transfer T per person. Thus,
the government budget constraint is
NT = Nτcg +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τcg
∗
s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
Nτ`wseshM,s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τ`wsesh
∗
M,s. (14)
2.4 Equilibrium
Now, we can define a competitive equilibrium of the economy. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium
in which firms choose the same technology pair, i.e., (Am, Af ).
Definition. Given a tax system (τc, τ`), a symmetric competitive equilibrium of the economy is a
set of a price system (wm, wf ), time allocation {h∗M,s, h∗N,s, hM,s, hN,s}s∈{m,f}, quantities
({c∗s, cs, g∗s}s∈{m,f}, g, {Ls}s∈{m,f}), technology choice {As}s∈{m,f}, and a lump-sum transfer T such
that
13 Again, we are assuming the interior solution.
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1. given prices, households maximize their utility;
2. given prices and technology constraint, firms maximize their profit;
3. markets clear: ∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s g
∗
s +Ng = Y, (15)
Ls = N∗s esh
∗
M,s +NeshM,s ∀s ∈ {m, f}; and (16)
4. the government budget constraint (14) is satisfied.
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, while conducting counterfactual simulations with the model described in the previous
section, we ask the following question: what are the quantitative effects of technology choice on the
cross-country variations in the various gender gaps, including the hourly wage gap wmem/(wfef )
and time gap h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f of the single households and that hN,m/hN,f of the couple households. The
results reveal that technology choice has a significant impact on all the gender gaps. In addition,
the mechanisms determining the time gaps of the single and couple households are also considered
to be different, which implies that the convergence in Am/Af is associated with a convergence in
the single time gap h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f but not in the couple time gap hN,m/hN,f .
In the following subsections, we first calibrate the model and design the simulation method,
which allows us to quantify the effects of technology choice on the gender gaps. We then provide
the results and focus on the importance of technology choice in the subsections that follow. In
our study, we use cross-section datasets that consist mainly of the Multinational Time Use Study
(MTUS), Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities (Japan), and the EU KLEMS. We will discuss
these datasets in Appendix A.
3.1 Calibration
In the couple households, we specify the leisure function, `, in the couple households as follows:
`(1− hM,m − hN,m, 1− hM,f − hN,f ) =
∑
s∈{m,f}
(1− αs)(1− hM,s − hN,s)
1−γs − 1
1− γs , (17)
where αs ∈ (0, 1) is the weight of consumption. Stated differently, we assume that within each
couple household, members solve a Pareto problem with equal treatment where the actions of each
member affect the partner’s utility only indirectly.
Given this specification and those presented in the previous section, we calibrate the unknown
variables, such as productivities As and consumption (c∗s, cs), and parameters together by solving
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the simultaneous equations derived from the FOCs and, in some cases, by using an estimation.
Intuitively, we assume that under the calibrated parameters, the equilibrium is equivalent to the
observed data.14
There are 24 parameters, each of which is categorized into one of two types of parameters:
household- and firm-side parameters. The household-side parameters consist of preference {α∗s, αs, γs}s∈{m,f},
home production ({ξ∗s , zs}s∈{m,f}, ξ, η, ρ), household structure ({N∗s }s∈{m,f}, N) in workers, skill
{es}s∈{m,f}, and tax rates (τc, τ`). The firm-side parameters consists of the elasticity of substitution
(1/(1− σ)) between males and females and the technology constraint (ω, υ,B). The results of the
calibration are summarized in Tables 16 and 17.
3.2 Simulation Method
In quantifying the effects of technology choice on the cross-country variations in the gender gaps, we
counterfactually assume that all countries converge to the same environment, e.g., the same U.S.-
equivalent level of parameters, and then compare competitive equilibria under the following two
scenarios. In each case, to obtain a competitive equilibrium, we solve the simultaneous equations
derived from the equilibrium conditions of { Y , As, ws, Ls, hM,s, h∗M,s, hN,s, h∗N,s, cs, c∗s, g∗s , g, T
}s∈{m,f} in the way that is described in Appendix C. In the first scenario, firms can optimally choose
their technology (we call this case the appropriate technology choice); by assumption, there are no
cross-country variations in the gender gaps after convergence in the environment. By contrast, the
second scenario assumes that firms cannot choose their optimal technology and are thus faced with
the calibrated country-specific Am/Af because of sufficiently high adjustment costs or, more broadly
interpreted, because of history dependence (we call this case the inappropriate technology choice).
Specifically, (Am, Af ) is determined by the country-specific result Am/Am = Am,data/Af,data of the
calibration and the technology constraint (2), the latter of which has the U.S. equivalent (υ,B)
for all countries. In this case, we should observe cross-country variations in the gender gaps that
arise purely due to the cross-country variations in firms’ technology choices before the change in
the environments.
Thus, to the extent that the cross-country variations in the gender gaps observed in the data
are reproduced by the inappropriate technology choice, we can say that the effects of technology
choices on the cross-country variations in the gender gaps are substantial. More specifically, by
measuring the correlation between the data and the counterfactual under the inappropriate tech-
nology choice (let Corr(CF,Data) denote the correlation)— and then by calculating the ratio of
14 Because we take the values of elasticities from previous studies, this calibration approach suggests that the
parameters except for the elasticities are computed as residuals, which is why we follow the previous studies in the
specification while keeping the model as simple as possible. Even with limited availability of the time use data, this
method— together with the simple model— allows us to identify the values of the parameters. The procedure is
described in more detail in Appendix B.
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the cross-country variance V ar(CF ) of some gender gap under the inappropriate technology choice
to that V ar(Data) of the corresponding data— we can quantify the impacts of technology choice
on the cross-country variations in the gender gaps. If Corr(CF,Data) < 0, then technology choice
itself cannot explain the observed variation, and from a different perspective the larger values of
V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) imply that the observed technology choices affected the variations in the gen-
der gaps more significantly. Therefore, if both Corr(CF,Data) and V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) are near
one, it can be said that technology choice itself explains the observed variations in the gender gaps.
In what follows, we call the above method of comparing the inappropriate technology choice
with the data the independent experiment of technology choice. A similar method can be applied
to the other sources of the cross-country variation of the gender gaps, such as effort zs, skill es
and preference (α∗s, αs). Thus, to quantify the impacts of a factor, we counterfactually assume that
countries are different only in this factor and compare the associated equilibrium with the data. We
also call this experiment the independent experiment. In this case, however, to exclude the effect of
technology choices, the technology choices are assumed to be exogenously given in the appropriate
technology level.15
We also design another type of experiment, which we call conditional experiments of technology
choice. Assuming that the environments of countries except for one or some parameters of interest
converge to the U.S. equivalent, this experiment compares the two scenarios mentioned above. Thus,
a conditional experiment is a slight extension of the independent experiment, and we thus quantify
the impacts of factors in the same way as in the case of the independent experiment, i.e., using
the correlation Corr(CF,DATA) and the variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data). Intuitively, this
experiment quantifies the effects of the combination of several sources of cross-country variations in
gender gaps, including (at the least) technology choice.
3.3 Wage Gap
The theoretical implications of inappropriate technology choice for the wage gap may be understood
by comparing the inappropriate technology choice with appropriate technology choice, in which all
countries have the same parameter values as the U.S. and firms choose their technology optimally.
Then, the inappropriate technology choice is characterized by a shift of (Am, Af ) on the U.S.-
equivalent technology frontier.
Without loss of generality, suppose that Am and Af move from a northwest point US, which
represents the U.S. or the appropriate technology choice, to a southeast point i, which represents
country i on the U.S. equivalent technology frontier as illustrated in Figure 1, i.e., Am and Af
increase and decrease, respectively. Because of the associated changes in labor productivities, the
15 Even assuming that the technology choice is endogenously determined, these results have a negligibly small
change from independent experiments in which the technology choice is given in the level of appropriate technology
choice.
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Figure 1: Technology Shift on the U.S.-equivalent Technology Frontier
wage rate of the males and that of the females increases and decreases, respectively, which implies
that the efficiency wage gap, wm/wf , increases in the manner specified by (3), all other things equal.
However, this increase appears weakened by the general equilibrium effect or the associated increase
in the relative aggregate labor supply of males and, therefore, its negative effect on the wage gap
due to the decreasing returns to scale. For the single household decision, the previous literature,
such as Rogerson (2009), suggests that the single male (female) household increases (decreases) his
(her) time spent on market activities with its response to the wage rate strengthened by substituting
between market goods and time spent on his (her) home production. For couple households, the
integrated budget constraint makes the sign of the associated change in the household’s labor income
ambiguous. Thus, the magnification effects described above are now ambiguous with respect to
substituting between market goods and time devoted to home production on the response of the
market hour for each sex. However, even with this ambiguous magnification effect, we might expect
that an increase in the ratio hM,m/hM,f of market hours is a natural consequence of comparative
advantage, which is actually the case and is confirmed by our calculations.
This result is then compared with the observed cross-country variation in the hourly wage gap
wmem/(wfef ) by the independent experiment, which suggests that technology choice contributes to
the cross-country variation in the wage gap to a relatively large extent as illustrated by the left panel
of Figure 2 and Table 1. The variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) of technology choice is largest
among the sources of the gender gaps, 0.346. Not surprisingly, the correlation Corr(Data,CF )
between the data and counterfactual is positive and relatively close to one. Independent experiments
also suggest that skill es and preference (α∗s, αs) are additional important sources of the cross-country
variation in the wage gap. The variance ratios of these are approximately 78% and 36% of that of
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technology choice, respectively. The former is consistent with the literature and, together with the
latter, suggests the importance of the general equilibrium analysis that can capture the effect of the
latter and verifies its relatively large impact on the cross-country variation in the wage gap.
Conditional experiments support the result of the independent experiment that technology
choice is important in understanding the cross-country variation in the wage gap. Both the vari-
ance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) and correlation Corr(Data,CF ) are robust even when we add
another source of the cross-country variation of the gender gaps in addition to technology choice.
Importantly, the pair of technology choice and preference explains the majority of the cross-country
variation in the wage gap with a variance ratio of 0.893 and a correlation of 0.927, as indicated in
Table 1; moreover, the correlation of the combination is well above the summation of the variance
ratios associated with the independent experiments of technology choice and preference. If we add
either effort or skill in addition to preference, both measures move closer to one; however, compared
with the combination of technology choice and preference, the improvements are relatively small.
3.4 Single Time Gap
Suppose again that technology (Am, Af ) shifts toward the southeast on the U.S. equivalent tech-
nology frontier and the efficiency wage gap wm/wf thus also increases as demonstrated by the
previous subsection. Each single household then takes these changes as given and chooses the time
h∗N,s devoted to her or his own home production. According to (8), the associated change in the
time gap h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f , is the sum of the two counteracting forces: The first is due to the associated
increase in the relative opportunity costs, i.e., the change in (wm/wf )−1/(1−η), which is negative.
The second is positive because of the complementarity between market goods and time devoted
to home production, i.e., the change in g∗m/g∗f which appears to increase because g
∗
m (g
∗
f ) is likely
to increase (decrease) faced with an increase (decrease) in the wage rate wm (wf ). The resulting
change in the time gap is negative.
Then, the question is as follows to what extent can this cross-country variation in the time
gap induced by technology choice explain the observed variation across countries? The independent
experiment suggests that technology choice can explain not all but some non-negligible part of of the
cross-country variation in the time gaps of single households. A positive correlation Corr(Data,CF )
between the data and counterfactual, although much smaller than that for of the wage gap (as
shown by the center panel of Figure 2 or Table 2), implies that the cross-country variation induced
by technology choice is consistent with the observed variation. In addition, the value of the variance
ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data), 0.228, indicates that its impact is not negligible.
The importance of technology choice in understanding the cross-country variation in the time
gap is also suggested by comparisons between the independent experiment of technology choice
with those of the other sources of the cross-country variation. Skill es, which directly affects the
time gap, has the highest variance ratio, 0.478, which is approximately twice as large as that of
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technology choice. However, a negative correlation, −0.164, suggests that skill itself cannot explain
the observed cross-country variation. Among the other sources affecting the time gap through
general equilibrium effects only, preference has comparable numbers for both the variance ratio and
correlation, 0.216 and 0.242, respectively. Effort, tax and population, the first of which is closely
related to the couple households, have negligible impacts on the time gap because the variance ratio
is relatively small compared with that of technology choice.
This conclusion is robust in the sense that neither the correlation Corr(Data,CF ) nor vari-
ance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) change significantly, even if we allow for additional variations in
the other sources of the gender gaps. As demonstrated in Table 2 (which reports the results of
several conditional experiments), the correlation Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and counter-
factual remains positive and range from 0.089 for the skill gap to 0.372 for tax, and the variance
ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) is also far from zero, ranging from 0.158 for tax to 1.184 for skill and
preference.
3.5 Couple Time Gap
We also assume a southeast shift of technology (Am/Af ) on the U.S.-equivalent frontier. Then,
unlike the single household, we should observe a clear-cut relationship between the associated in-
crease in the efficiency wage gap wm/wf and the time gap hN,m/hN,f . According to (13), the couple
household chooses its members’ time devoted to home production such that the female engages in
home production more than the male, or stated differently, the time gap hN,m/hN,f is negatively
correlated with the efficiency wage gap wm/wf . Intuitively, market goods, g, are shared as public
goods within the households through cooperation between members and the effects of complemen-
tarity between market goods and time devoted to home production on the time gap thus cancel
out across members; thus, only the effects of the opportunity costs prevail and result in a perfect
log-linear relationship between the time and wage gaps.
To what extent can this cross-country variation in the time gap induced by technology choice
explain the actual variation? Notably, the results contrast with the case of the single household.
The independent experiment indicates that the correlation Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and
counterfactual is negative, with a value of approximately −0.240, as shown in Table 3 or observed
in the right panel of Figure 2, which suggests that technology choice cannot explain the observed
cross-country variation in the time gap by itself. Thus, the observed cross-country variation in the
time gap of the couple household is driven by some factor(s) whose effects are negatively correlated
with the effects of technology choice.
However, this result does not indicate that technology choice is not an important source of the
cross-country variation in the time gap. In terms of the impact of technology choice on the cross-
country variation in the time gap, which is measured by the variation ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data),
the technology choice itself has a considerable impact on the time gap, hN,m/hN,f , of the couple
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household. Table 3 reports that the variance ratio is approximately 0.491. This effect is robust in
the sense that the variance ratio does not change significantly and instead increases when combined
with other sources of the cross-country variation of the gender gaps, as observed in conditional
experiments.
In addition, technology choice is also important in the sense that there is no single factor that can
explain the actual cross-country variation in the time gap of the couple households. Although effort
zs has a correlation Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and counterfactual that is sufficiently close
to one, its variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) is too large to explain the cross-country variation.
Instead, the combination of technology choice and effort or the triplet of technology choice, effort
and preference has a variance ratio and correlation closer to one compared with those of either
technology choice or effort by itself, which implies that without technology choice it is difficult
to explain the cross-country variation in the time gap without technology choice. Among these
parameters, the latter explains the cross-country variation the most with a variance ratio of 1.144
and correlation of 0.984.
The above results thus suggest that the mechanisms that determine the time devoted to home
production are crucially different across different types of households not only in the sense that the
cooperation between members makes the net effects of the opportunity costs larger but also in the
sense that the actual cross-country variation in the time gap of the couple household deviates from
the prediction with technology choice only to a small extent. An immediate implication of this result
is that the global policy trend, which is expected to narrow gender gaps by affecting technology
choice and is characterized by the convergence in Am/Af , might not achieve smaller wage and time
gaps simultaneously (at least for couple households). As demonstrated by the independent and
conditional experiments, the cross-country variation in technology choice Am/Af offsets the cross-
country variation in the time gap of the couple households which is widened by the cross-country
variation in effort zs. Thus, if the Am/Af values of countries converge, the effect of effort becomes
larger, resulting in a wider cross-country variation in the time gap. This result indicates that in
some countries, the time gap will become narrower, whereas other countries will experience larger
time gaps.16
4 Robustness Analysis
We performed sensitivity checks by changing parameter values, assumptions and utility function
specifications within the context of the baseline. Tables 4–6 compare the results when the main
16 As demonstrated in Section 4, the result that the correlation between couple time gaps from the data and
counterfactual under the inappropriate technology choice is negative and robust to different parameter values and
specifications. Thus, stated differently, the implication that a convergence in Am/Af results in a divergence in the
couple time gap hN,m/hN,f is also a robust result.
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Figure 2: Effects of Technology Choice on the Gender Gaps: Independent Experiment
Notes: Figure shows the male-female to ratio for each variable. The green open circles are the counterfactual simulation
results that are represented.
experiments are implemented under alternative assumptions. These results indicate that firm tech-
nology choice can explain the cross-country variance to some extent, even under different assump-
tions; thus, we concluded that firm technology choice has a significant impact on the gender wage
and time gaps.
Specifically, we conduct four types of sensitivity experiments:
1. Endogenous Home Production Effort
2. With Physical Capital Model
3. Composite Type Utility Function
4. Changing Elasticity of Substitution Values
Different from calibration forms and simulation algorithms of the baseline model are discussed in
Appendix D.
4.1 Endogenous Home Production Effort
The home production effort, or simply effort, zs is given exogenously in the main experiments: thus,
even, when a firm changes its technology choice, the home production effort does not change. For
example, if a firm decides to enhance life-work balance to help female workers, the couple household
may change each spouse’s function and the husband may work more in home production, in which
case, the male’s home production effort will increase due to the changing comparative advantage.
In this subsection, we examine such an effect for effort. The couple household can select the effort
under the constraint of a technology frontier in home production in a similar manner as the firms’
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technology choice problem. The couple household maximizes its utility function subject to the
following constraint
zωHm + υHz
ωH
f ≤ BH (18)
and those that appear in the benchmark case. This constraint plays a similar role as in technology
choice problem of the firm side. BH is the inverse measure of the barrier to a household technology
frontier, υH is the relative cost of shifting to spouse’s home production productivity and ωH governs
the curvature of the household technology frontier. If ρ > 0, which is the case that we consider in
this paper, then ωH > 1 guarantees an interior solution of the household.
Considering the FOCs with respect to zm and zf and taking the ratio of this equation for each
sex s,
zm
zf
= υ
1−ρ
(1−ρ)ωH−1
H
(
wm
wf
)− ρ
(1−ρ)ωH−1
,
implies that the home production effort changes due to the comparative advantage of market work.
When we calibrate zm and zf using the data, we restrict ourselves to zm + zf = 1 as the main
experiment settings to identify these parameters. However, when performing simulations, we can
identify these parameters without this restriction, i.e., zm + zf 6= 1.
4.2 With Physical Capital Model
In this subsection, the endogenous home production effort model is further extended to include
capital stock that is given exogenously. Each household has one unit of capital stock k and rents it
to firms at rental rate r.17 The total capital stock Nk equals K. The couple and single households’
budget constraint are added capital income,
Couple household: (1 + τc)g ≤ (1− τ`)(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) + (1− τk)2rk + 2T, (19)
Single household: (1 + τc)g∗s ≤ (1− τ`)wsesh∗M,s + (1− τk)rk + T, (20)
where τk is the capital income tax, r is the rental rate of capital and k is the per capita physical
capital, k ≡ K/N.
The government’s budget constraint also changes when including capital income tax revenue,
NT = Nτcg +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τcg
∗
s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
Nτ`wseshM,s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τ`wsesh
∗
M,s + τkK. (21)
The FOCs of the household are the same as in the main model.
17 We assume that each type of household has the same amount of capital stock, because we cannot observe a
quantity of capital stock by type of households.
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Firms then use capital, labor, and technology to produce output according to the two-tier
production function,
max
K, {Ls, As, K}s∈{m,f}
{Y − wmLm − wfLf − rK},
Y = Kθ [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1−θ
σ (22)
s.t. Aωm + υA
ω
f ≤ B,
where θ is the capital share and 0 < θ < 1.
The equilibrium definition is discussed in Appendix D.2.
4.3 Composite-type Utility Function
The utility function in the baseline model is separable between consumption and leisure and also
between spouses. We examine whether we would obtain the same results under different specifica-
tions for the household utility function. In this subsection, we selected the following specification,
which addresses the composite hours of leisure between husband and wife:
max
 ∑
s∈{m,f}
αs ln(cs) + b ln
{
[am(1− hM,m − hN,m)² + af (1− hM,f − hN,f )²]
1
²
} , (23)
where ² < 1 governs the elasticity 1/(1− ²) between the male and female in leisure activities.
4.4 Elasticity of Substitution
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there are no empirical studies on the elasticity of substitution
of home production between couples, i.e., 1/(1 − ρ). However, previous studies of the gender gap
provide this elasticity with a lack of foundation. However, the sharing roles of home production
might be affected by this elasticity. Therefore, we verified the sensitivity of the value of elasticity.
In addition, a few empirical works have estimated the elasticity of substitution between male
labor and female labor, 1/(1 − σ). Our baseline simulation is based on the mean value of these
studies, and we verified the sensitivity of this value.
4.5 Results
We conduct several alternative specification and parameters checks to verify the robustness of the
findings reported above. We do not experiment with effort because home production effort is
determined endogenously in these models, with the exception of the baseline model. Tables 4–6
reveal that there is no significant difference among specifications and parameter settings. We can
conclude that our results are robust.
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5 Conclusion
To what extent and how does firm technology choice affect the cross-country variations in the gender
gap in wage and time allocation?
To answer this question, we build a general equilibrium model of the gender wage gap and
time allocation with technology choice and home production of households with different marital
statuses. Firms choose their production technology depending on the relative abundance of labor
for each sex and the relative costs of shifting their technology.
The main finding is that technology choice has considerable impacts on the cross-country vari-
ation in not only the gender wage gap but also the gender difference of time allocation, which
implies that the effects of a policy aiming to narrow the gender gaps are gradual because the policy
must face firms’ technology choice, including the labor market institutions, corporate culture, and
social norms, which are difficult to change dramatically. Our findings also indicate that there is no
single mechanism determining the observed cross-country variations in gender gaps. Therefore, a
convergence in the technology choice across countries itself does not result in a convergence in all
the gender gap measures in general, which suggests that policy makers should set multiple targets
when intending to narrow all gender gap measures.
A possible extension of this study would be to introduce bargaining into the household problem
by considering the literature of the collective model (cf. Bourguignon et al. (2009)).
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Appendix A Data
Appendix A provides details of the data that we used for calibration and simulation.
Appendix A.1 Gross Domestic Product
We used the per worker GDP denoted by y. The GDP data are based on value added in the
EU KLEMS. We convert national currency measured GDP into 1997-basis PPP value and exclude
government expenditures. The government expenditures data are obtained from OECD statistics.
The numbers of workers (number of persons engaged) are also obtained from EU KLEMS.
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Appendix A.2 Time Allocation
The data source of time allocation differs depending on the country. We used the Survey on
Time Use and Leisure Activities for Japan and the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) for all
other countries. The procedure for the construction of time allocation consistent with the model is
discussed below for each statistic.
Appendix A.2.1 Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS)
The time allocation data for market working hours and home production hours were obtained from
the MTUS. This dataset contains the time allocation of individuals among countries. There are
several versions of the data available, such as World 5.53, World 5.8, and World 6.0. The differences
among these three versions include that the latter two versions include participants under 18 and the
time allocation data are presented in a more detailed manner, whereas the data in World 5.53 are
categorized more broadly. By dividing the time allocation of a day into three blocks, namely, market
work, home production, and leisure, World 5.53 fully satisfies our aim. The countries included in
World 5.53 are listed in Table 7.
MTUS time use data are provided in the form of a diary collected from individuals. The records
of one’s behaviors are divided into 41 harmonized activities, and the amount of time allocated
(measured in minutes) for each activity is available. Therefore, we constructed the definition of time
allocation for market work, home production, and leisure and reallocated the former 41 activities
into each category. Specifically, we selected four variables to indicate market work, five variables to
indicate home production, and the remaining variables to indicate leisure. Details are provided in
Tables 8 and 9.
Next, we describe the methodology for constructing the time use data consistently for our
analysis. We excluded individuals who were not employed (including retired people) and only used
individuals in the range of 20 to 60 years old. Both students and individuals with military duty
were omitted. In addition, we ignored the diaries recorded on weekends, as well as people working
less than 25 hours per week or working more than 70 hours per week. The upper bound for home
production hours was set to 10 hours per day. After filtering out the noisy samples, we were left
with countries that had a sufficient sample size for constructing our time allocation data.
The method of construction the time allocation variables is fairly simple. We aggregate all the
individuals’ time allocations from their diaries that satisfied our requirements and employed the
mean value as the representing time allocation for the economy. The basic statistics are presented
in Tables 10 and 11.
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Appendix A.2.2 Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities
We obtained the time allocation data for Japan from the aggregated data of the Survey on Time
Use and Leisure Activities (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau of
Japan.). The construction methods for our variables are almost the same as MTUS. We defined
worked hours as the market working hours hM,s {s ∈ m, f}, and housework as home production
hours hN,s {s ∈ m, f}. The data are presented in Table 12.
Appendix B Calibration
In this section, we describe the detailed procedure of our calibration. Table 13 presents all the
variables in the baseline model. Variables are classified into three types: “Data” represents the
variables given by data directly, “Exogenous parameters” are mainly taken from previous studies,
and “Calibrated parameters” are determined from the equations presented below.
We first calibrate the household structure ({N∗s }s∈{m,f}, N) and skill {es}s∈{m,f}, and tax rates
(τc, τL), which are independently calibrated. Then, given the result and also the fixed exogenous
parameters, we calibrate the firm-side parameters. Finally, we calibrate the remainder of the pa-
rameters on the household side.
Appendix B.1 Independently Calibrated Parameters
Household Structure
The main purpose of our paper is to investigate the aggregate gender gap, which requires the male-
female ratio of the labor supply in our model to match the data. To achieve this requirement, we
calibrate the household structure to fit the male-female ratio of the labor supply data. Our model’s
population consists of three groups: couple households N with a male and a female, male single
households N∗m and female single households N∗f , the members of which consist of only a male or
only a female, respectively; thus, we calibrate the three parameters N, N∗m, N∗f . Regarding the
matched labor supply ratio, we also uses the Census of each country to calibrate the data to fit
the Census household structure as much as possible. We use the household structure as target in
addition to the labor supply ratio because the household structure system in our model requires
two calibration targets to satisfy the rank conditions.
Except for Japan and the U.S., we use EU statistics on income and living conditions, which
reports the distribution of population by household type. This database contains no information
about the age profile and presence or absence of children by gender for a single person. Therefore,
we assume that a single person with dependent children has the same ratio by gender. We calculated
N∗s =
Single person ratio− Single person with dependent children ratio
Single person ratio
26
× Single person by sex ratio,
N = Two adults younger than 65 years.
Japan’s household structure data are obtained from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Com-
munications, Census, 2005 and the U.S. data are obtained from the Census Bureau, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 2009. We use the following figures:
N∗s = Household living alone by sex,
N = Married Couple without children.
Finally, we normalize the total number of households N =
∑
s∈{m,f}N
∗
s +N to unity.
Skill
Skill es is calibrated by human capital accumulated in schooling. Specifically, we employ a method-
ology similar to that reported in Caselli and Coleman (2006) to construct the skill data using EU
KLEMS (Release March 2008). As discussed above, skill is defined as a weighted sum of the daily
working hour ratio per worker, in which the workers are divided into three groups based on their re-
spective schooling: low, medium and high education. We set the low educated group as the baseline
and take a weighted sum of the medium- and high-educated workers relative to the low-educated
workers. The weight for the accumulation of a group is its relative labor income per unit of working
hours to the baseline group. The skill measure is independently constructed for males and females,
and each skill is normalized by the total sum of both efficiency units.
Tax Rates
Both consumption and labor income tax rates are acquired from McDaniel (2007), who provides
these tax rates as well as the taxes on investment and capital for 15 OECD countries.
Appendix B.2 Firm-side Parameters
For the firm-side parameters, we first calibrate the hourly gender wage gap wmem/(wfef ), and fix
the value of the elasticity of substitution between the market hours of males and females, 1/(1−σ).
Then, using these results as well as those of the independently calibrated parameters and MTUS,
we calibrate (Am, Af ) for eight countries. Finally, we conduct a regression to obtain the values of
(ω, υ,B) under a certain assumption.
Hourly Gender Wage Gap
The hourly gender wage gap wmem/(wfef ) is calculated from the real labor compensation level and
total hours worked by male and female workers. Both variables are obtained from the EU KLEMS
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data. Note that the skill ratio can be obtained from the result found in Appendix B.1. The hourly
wage rate can be defined as the real labor compensation level divided by the total hours worked by
each group of workers.
Elasticity of Substitution between Market Hours of Male and Female Labor
We select σ = 0.52, which implies that the elasticity of substitution between the market hours
worked by males and females is 2.08. This value falls within the empirically plausible range, from
two to three. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2011) survey studies of the elasticity of substitution between
market hours of males and females. Layard (1982) reports a value of two for the U.K. Lewis (1985)
reports a value of 2.3 for Australia, and Weinberg (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2004) report values
of 2.4 and 3, respectively for the U.S.
Labor-Augmenting Technologies
The values of (Am, Af ) are given by the following equations:
Am =
Y
Lm

(
wmem
wfef
)
Lm(
wmem
wfef
)
Lm + emef Lf

1
σ
, Af =
Y
Lf
 emef Lf(
wmem
wfef
)
Lm + emef Lf
 1σ .
These values are obtained from the hourly wage gap equation (3) and the production function (1).
We have previously determined the hourly wage gap wmem/(wfef ) and the skill ratio em/ef . For
the output of the market goods, we use the GDP net of government expenditure. The data source
and calculation are explained in Appendix A. For Ls, we use the labor market clearing condition
(40) with the market hour data obtained from MTUS and the previously calibrated household
structure. Note that Y in the above equation corresponds to the GDP per capita if we normalize
the total population N of the economy to unity.
Estimation of ω
The parameter ω of the technology frontier can be estimated using the following equation derived
from the firms’ optimality conditions. We recall from equation (4) and take the logarithm and the
first-difference of both sides to arrive at the following specification,
dlog
(
Am,i,t
Af,i,t
)
=
σ
ω − σdlog
(
Lm,i,t
Lf,i,t
)
+
1
ω − σdlog (υi,t)
We then build a fixed-effect model assuming that ω and σ are constant across all countries.
dlog
(
Am,i,t
Af,i,t
)
= β dlog
(
Lm,i,t
Lf,i,t
)
+ FEi,
where FEi is a fixed effect term and equals to 1ω−σdlog (υi,t). Note that this specification implicitly
assumes the constant time trend of υ, which cannot appear in our static model but is in the data.
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To perform the estimation of the above equation, we compiled the (unbalanced) panel data from
1981 to 2005 for the following 14 countries, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. The descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 14, and the estimated results are presented in Table 15. Because
the estimated values correspond to the coefficients of the first term on the RHS of the equation,
the parameter ω = 1.12 can be easily calculated for a given σ from ω = σ/β + σ. These estimation
results are consistent with our assumption that the solution to the firm’s problems is interior, i.e.,
ω > σ/(1− σ).
Relative Cost υ and Technology Frontier B
After estimating ω, we can calculate the relative costs υ and shift parameter B analytically. υ is
computed from the firm-side FOCs of As,
υ =
(
Am
Af
)ω−σ (Lm
Lf
)−σ
,
and B is computed using the technology constraint (2),
B = Aωm + υA
ω
f .
Appendix B.3 Household-side Parameters
For the remaining household-side parameters, we first select the values of elasticities. Then, using
the MTUS and FOCs of the households’ problem, we calibrate {ξ∗s , α∗s}s∈{m,f} related to the single
household and ({zs}s∈{m,f}, ξ, {αs}s∈{m,f}) related to the couple household in order.
The Inverse of the Frisch Elasticity of Leisure
We set γs = γ∗s = 0.9, which is close to the value of one, as selected by Prescott (2004). According
to Rogerson (2009), who studies a model of time allocation with home production that has the same
specification as our model, time allocation does not depend significantly on the value of the Frisch
elasticity of leisure.
Elasticity of Substitution between Home Goods and Composite Time
We conduct our quantitative analysis using several values of η in the range of 0.4 to 0.6, which is the
empirically plausible range suggested by the literature. As a study using macro data, McGrattan
et al. (1997) report a range of 0.40 to 0.45, whereas Chang and Schorfheide (2003) report a range
of 0.55 to 0.60. Micro studies report similar ranges. Rupert et al. (1995) report a range of 0.40 to
0.45 and Aguiar and Hurst (2007) report a range of 0.50 to 0.60.
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Elasticity of Substitution between a Male’s and a Female’s Time Devoted to Home
Production
We set ρ = 0.5, which implies that the value of the elasticity of substitution between time devoted
to home production of a male and a female is two. We also consider other values for ρ to verify the
robustness of our results in Section 4.
Wage Rates and Lump-sum Transfer
To calibrate the remaining household-side parameters, we use the FOCs of the households’ problem.
However, we require the values of wage rates {ws}s∈{m,f} and the lump-sum transfer T that are
consistent with the model and previous calibration.
The wage rate ws is given by the marginal productivity condition.
The lump-sum transfer T is given by
T = (τc + τ`)
(N
N
) ∑
s∈{m,f}
wseshM,s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
(
N∗s
N
)
wsesh
∗
M,s
 ,
which is obtained by substituting the budget constraints of the households, (6) and (11), into the
government budget constraint and solving the result for T .
Single Household
For the single household, we first calibrate ξ∗s by
ξ∗s =
(esh∗N,s)
η−1
g∗η−1s 1−τ`1+τcws + (esh
∗
N,s)η−1
, all s ∈ {m, f},
which is obtained from (7). g∗s is computed using the budget constraint (6). We use MTUS for the
time allocation, i.e., h∗M,s and h
∗
N,s.
Given the value of ξ∗s , we then calibrate α∗s using one of the FOCs:
α∗s =
(1− h∗M,s − h∗N,s)−γ
∗
s
(1− h∗M,s − h∗N,s)−γ∗s +
(1−ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η−1es
ξ∗sg
∗η
s +(1−ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η
, all s ∈ {m, f}.
Couple Household
For the couple household, we first calibrate {zs}s∈{m,f} using
zf =
1(
wm
wf
)(
emhN,m
efhN,f
)1−ρ
+ 1
, zm = 1− zf ,
the former of which is given by substituting zm = 1− zf into (13) and solving the result for zf .
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Then, given this result, we obtain the value of ξ using
ξ =
[zm(emhNm)ρ + zf (efhNf )ρ]
η
ρ
−1
zs(eshNs)ρ−1
gη−1 1−τ`1+τcws + [zm(emhNm)
ρ + zf (efhNf )ρ]
η
ρ
−1
zs(eshNs)ρ−1
,
which is obtained from (13) with s = m.
Finally, we obtain {αs}s∈{m,f} using
αm =
D2D3
D1
+D4 −D3
D2D3
D1
+D4 +D3
, αf = 1− D2
D1
(1− αm),
where
D1 ≡ wmem
wfef
, D2 ≡ (1− hM,m − hN,m)
−γm
(1− hM,f − hN,f )−γf ,
D3 ≡ ξg
η−1
ξgη + (1− ξ)(zm(emhNm)ρ + zf (efhNf )ρ)
η
ρ
1− τ`
1 + τc
wmem, D4 ≡ (1− hM,m − hN,m)−γm .
This system of equations is obtained by solving
D1 =
1− αm
1− αf D2,
D3 =
1− αm
αm + αf
D4,
which are obtained from the FOCs for (αm, αf ).
Appendix C Algorithm for Computing a Competitive Equilibrium
In this appendix, we describe the detail of the computation of an equilibrium, which is to solve the
following simultaneous equations consisting of the equilibrium conditions for endogenous variables:
g =
1− τ`
1 + τc
(wmemhM,m + wfefhM,f ) +
2T
1 + τc
, (24)
ξgη−1
ξgη + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
1− τ`
1 + τc
wses
=
1− αs
αm + αf
(1− hM,s − hN,s)−γs , ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (25)
(1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
−1
ξgη + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
zs(eshN,s)ρ−1es
=
1− αs
αm + αf
(1− hM,s − hN,s)−γs , ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (26)
cs =
αs
αm + αf
{
ξgη + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
} 1
η
, ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (27)
α∗sξ∗s
1−τ`
1+τc
wses
g∗s
[
ξ∗s + (1− ξ∗s )
(
ξ∗s
1−ξ∗s
1−τ`
1+τc
ws
) η
η−1
]
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= (1− α∗s)
[
1− h∗Ms −
(
ξ∗s
1− ξ∗s
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws
) 1
η−1 g∗s
es
]−γ∗s
, ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (28)
g∗s =
1− τ`
1 + τc
wsesh
∗
M,s +
T
1 + τc
, ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (29)
h∗N,s =
g∗s
es
(
ξ∗s
1− ξ∗s
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws
) 1
η−1
, ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (30)
c∗s =
[
ξ∗sg
∗η
s + (1− ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η
] 1
η , ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (31)
Aωm + υA
ω
f = B, (32)
Am
Af
= υ
1
ω−σ
(
Lm
Lf
) σ
ω−σ
, (33)
Y = [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ , (34)
ws = [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ
−1(AsLs)σ−1As, ∀s ∈ {m, f} (35)
T =
τc + τ`
N
{N(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +N∗m(wmemh∗Mm) +N∗f (wfefh∗Mf )
}
, (36)
Ls = N∗s esh
∗
M,s +NeshM,s, ∀s ∈ {m, f}, (37)
where endogenous variables and parameters are as follows:
Endogenous variables: {Y , As, ws, Ls, hM,s, h∗M,s, hN,s, h∗N,s, cs, c∗s, g∗s , g, T}s∈{m,f}
Parameters: {υ, ω, B, ξ, ξ∗s , αs, α∗s, es, zs, σ, η, τc, τ`, ρ, N , N∗s , N}s∈{m,f}
Instead of solving the above system straightforwardly, we compute the solution by iterative
methods in which we make an initial guess of aggregate variables such as prices and the lump-sum
transfer and then update those variables by solving the households’ and firms’ problems for the
guessed prices.
The specific algorithm is described below. One of the important remarks is to apply a grid search
to computing the optimal choice of the pair (hM,m, hM,f ) of market work of the couple household
to consider the division of labor among the couple household, i.e., there might be a corner solution,
which makes it inappropriate to use the FOCs for the interior pair (hM,m, hM,f ) presented in the
text. The optimal time allocation other than market work is then uniquely determined for each pair
(hM,m, hM,f ) thanks to the Inada conditions, which allows us to use the FOCs. As for the single
household, given the representative agent within the single household of each sex, we use the FOCs
by focusing on the interest case in which singles do not fully depend on non-labor incomes, i.e., the
lump-sum transfer.
Step 1: Make an initial guess {wm = w0m, wf = w0f , T = T 0} and initialize the lower bound
(hM,s,1 = 0.001) and the upper bound (hM,s,n = 0.7) of the grid of couple households’ market
works, where we fix the number n of the grid points through the following whole processes in
their entirely.
Step 2: For the given lower and upper bounds, hM,s,1 and hM,s,n, generate the equidistant grid,
32
i.e., hM,m,i ∈ {hM,m,1, · · · · · · , hM,m,n}, hM,f,j ∈ {hM,f,1, · · · · · · , hM,f,n}, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Step 3: Compute the optimal resource allocation and the associated utility for each fixed pair
(hM,m,i, hM,f,j) of the grid: ∀i, j = 1, · · · , n set
(11) : gi,j =
1− τ`
1 + τc
(wmemhM,m,i + wfefhM,f,i) +
2T
1 + τc
,
(hN,m,i, hN,f,j)

(1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,j)ρ]
η
ρ
−1
ξgηi,j + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,j)ρ]
η
ρ
zm(emhN,m,i)ρ−1em
=
1− αm
αm + αf
(1− hM,m,i − hN,m,i)−γm ,
(1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,j)ρ]
η
ρ
−1
ξgηi,j + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,j)ρ]
η
ρ
zf (efhN,f,j)ρ−1ef
=
1− αf
αm + αf
(1− hM,f,i − hN,f,j)−γf ..
=⇒ Solve the simultaneous equation for (hN,m,i, hN,f,j).
(10) : cm,i,j =
αm
αm + αf
{
ξgηi,j + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,j)ρ]
η
ρ
} 1
η
,
FOC of cs,i,j : cf,i,j =
αf
αm
cm,i,j ,
(9) : Ui,j =
∑
s∈{m,f}
{
αs ln(cs,i,j) + (1− αs)(1− hM,s,i − hN,s,i)
1−γs − 1
1− γs
}
,
Step 4: Compute (i∗, j∗) = argmaxi,j∈{1,···,n} Ui,j .
If max{|hM,m,i∗ −hM,m,i∗±1|, |hM,m,i∗ −hM,m,i∗±1|} < ², then set hM,m = hM,m,i∗ and hM,f =
hM,f,i∗ and proceed to Step 5. Otherwise, update the lower and upper bounds for the grid as
follows and return to Step 2.: For the male,
hM,m,1 = hM,m,i∗−1, hM,m,n = hM,m,i∗+1, if i∗ > 1 and i∗ < n,
hM,m,1 = hM,m,i∗ , hM,m,n = hM,m,i∗+1, if i∗ = 1,
hM,m,1 = hM,m,i∗−1, hM,m,n = hM,m,i∗ , if i∗ = n.
For the female,
hM,f,1 = hM,f,j∗−1, hM,f,n = hM,f,j∗+1, if j∗ > 1 and j∗ < n,
hM,f,1 = hM,f,j∗ , hM,f,n = hM,f,j∗+1, if j∗ = 1,
hM,f,1 = hM,f,j∗−1, hM,f,n = hM,f,j∗ , if j∗ = n.
Step 5: Solve the equation for single households’ market work, h∗M,s, s ∈ {m, f},
α∗sξ∗s
1−τ`
1+τc
wses
g∗s
[
ξ∗s + (1− ξ∗s )
(
ξ∗s
1−ξ∗s
1−τ`
1+τc
ws
) η
η−1
] = (1− α∗s)
[
1− h∗Ms −
(
ξ∗s
1− ξ∗s
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws
) 1
η−1 g∗s
es
]−γ∗s
.
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Step 6: Compute (g∗s , h∗N,s, Ls), s ∈ {m, f}, using
(6) : g∗s =
1− τ`
1 + τc
wsesh
∗
M,s +
T
1 + τc
,
(7) : h∗N,s =
g∗s
es
(
ξ∗s
1− ξ∗s
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws
) 1
η−1
,
(5) : c∗s =
[
ξ∗sg
∗η
s + (1− ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η
] 1
η ,
(40) : Ls = N∗s esh
∗
M,s +NeshM,s.
In addition, compute (Am, Af ) as follows: In the case of appropriate technology choice,
(2) + (4) : Af =
B
1
ω(
υ + υ
ω
ω−σ
)(
Lm
Lf
) ωσ
ω−σ
,
(2) : Am =
(
B − υAωf
) 1
ω ,
In the case of inappropriate technology choice,
Af =
(
B
A
ω + υ
) 1
ω
,
Am = AAf ,
where A is an exogenous gender biased technology ratio given by the calibration using data
by country, A ≡ Am,data/Af,data.
After calculating Am and Af , compute (ws, Y, T ) using
FOC of Ls : ws = [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ
−1(AsLs)σ−1As,
(1) : Y = [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ ,
(6) + (11) + (14) : T =
τc + τ`
N
{N(wmemhMm + wfefhMf )
+N∗m(wmemh
∗
Mm) +N
∗
f (wfefh
∗
Mf )
}
.
Step 7: Set Λ = 0.5 and compute
w1s = Λw
0
s + (1− Λ)ws,
T 1 = ΛT 0 + (1− Λ)T.
Step 8: If
√
(w1m − w0m)2 + (w1f − w0f )2 + (T 1 − T 0)2 > ², then set w0s = w1s , T 0 = T 1 and return
to Step 1.
If
√
(w1m − w0m)2 + (w1f − w0f )2 + (T 1 − T 0)2 < ², then stop.
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Appendix D Robustness
In this section, we present calibration forms and a simulation algorithm that are different from the
benchmark model. The calibration and simulation results are available upon request.
Appendix D.1 Endogenous Home Production Effort
Appendix D.1.1 Calibration Forms
In this endogenous home production model, the only difference from the benchmark model is
the inclusion of the home production technology frontier, which has three unknown parameters
(ωH , υH , BH). We set ωH = 3 exogenously to avoid corner solutions. For the remaining two param-
eters υH and BH , we analytically derive the solutions,
υH =
(
zm
zf
)ωH−1(emhNm
efhNf
)−ρ
, (38)
BH = zωHm + υHz
ωH
f , (39)
the former of which is obtained from the FOCs with respect to zs.
Appendix D.1.2 Simulation Algorithm
We substitute
zf =
 BH
υH +
{
υH
(
emhNm
efhNf
)ρ} ωHωH−1

1
ωH
,
zm = (BH − υHzωHf )
1
ωH ,
(38) in Step 3 of the simulation algorithm presented in Appendix C.
Appendix D.2 With Physical Capital Model
Appendix D.2.1 Equilibrium
Definition. Given a tax system (τc, τ`, τk), a symmetric competitive equilibrium of the economy is
a set of a price system (wm, wf , r), time allocation {h∗M,s, h∗N,s, hM,s, hN,s}s∈{m,f}, quantities
({c∗s, cs, g∗s}s∈{m,f}, g, {Ls}s∈{m,f},K), technology choice {As}s∈{m,f}, and a lump-sum transfer T
such that
1. given prices, households maximize their utility;
2. given prices and technology constraint, firms maximize their profit;
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3. markets clear: ∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s g
∗
s +Ng = Y,
Ls = N∗s esh
∗
M,s +NeshM,s ∀s ∈ {m, f},∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s k +Nk = K; and
4. the government budget constraint (14) is satisfied.
Appendix D.2.2 Calibration Forms
Couple Household:
k =
K
N
(19) + (20) + (21) : T =
τc + τ`
N
{N(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +N∗m(wmemh∗Mm)
+N∗f (wfefh
∗
Mf )
}
+ (τc + τk)rk
(19) : g =
1− τ`
1 + τc
(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +
(1− τk)2rk
1 + τc
+
2T
1 + τc
Single Household:
(20) : g∗s =
1− τ`
1 + τc
wsesh
∗
M,s +
(1− τk)rk
1 + τc
+
T
1 + τc
,
Firm:
FOC of K : θ =
rK
Y
(22) + FOC of Ls : As =
1
Ls
(
Y
Kθ
) 1
1−θ
[
wsLs
wmLm + wfLf
] 1
σ
FOC of Ls : ws = (1− θ)Kθ[(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1−θ
σ
−1(AsLs)σ−1As
The remaining variables and parameters are the same as those used in the benchmark model.
Appendix D.2.3 Data
This model requires real capital stock data k, the capital compensation-to-GDP ratio θ, and capital
income tax rate τk. The capital stock and capital compensation-to-GDP ratio are obtained from the
EU KLEMS 2009 version, and the capital income tax rate is obtained from McDaniel (2007) (see
Table 12). EU KLEMS 2009 is the newest version: however this version does not include detailed
labor statistics, such as labor compensation by gender and by skill. Therefore, we also use the EU
KLEMS 2008 version for labor data.
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Appendix D.2.4 Simulation Algorithm
1. In Step 1 of the algorithm in Appendix C, add “r = r0 and r0 is given”.
2. In Step 3, use
g =
1− τ`
1 + τc
(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +
1− τk
1 + τc
2rk +
2T
1 + τc
.
3. In Step 7, use
g∗s =
1− τ`
1 + τc
wsesh
∗
M,s +
1− τk
1 + τc
rk +
T
1 + τc
,
ws = (1− θ)Kθ[(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ
−1(AsLs)σ−1As,
T =
τc + τ`
N
{
N(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +N∗m(wmemh
∗
Mm) +N
∗
f (wfefh
∗
Mf )
}
+ (τc + τk)rk,
and add the following equations:
(22) : Y = Kθ [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1−θ
σ ,
FOC of K : r =
θY
K
.
4. In Step 8, add
r1 = Λr0 + (1− Λ)r.
5. In Step 9, modify the convergence criterion,√
(r1 − r0)2 + (w1m − w0m)2 + (w1f − w0f )2 + (T 1 − T 0)2 < ².
Appendix D.3 Composite Leisure Function
With this specification, we calibrate ² such that ² is consistent with the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply reported in the previous studies. Thus we first derive the form of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. We use the reduced couple household’s problem,
max
g, {hM,s, hN,s, zs}
{
ln[H(·)] + b˜ ln
(
[am(1− hM,m − hN,m)² + af (1− hM,f − hN,f )²]
1
²
)}
s.t. H(g, emhN,m, efhN,f ) =
{
ξgη + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
} 1
η
,
(1 + τc)g ≤ (1− τ`)
∑
s∈{m,f}
wseshM,s + 2(1− τk)rk + 2T, (40)
hM,s + hN,s ≤ 1, all s ∈ {m, f},
zωHm + υHz
ωH
f ≤ BH ,
am + af = 1,
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where b˜ ≡ b/(αm + αf ).
From the FOCs of hMs,
b˜
as`
²−1
s
am`²m + af `²f
= χ(1− τ`)wses, ∀s, (41)
where χ is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. We further take the total differentiation
of this equation and suppose that dχ = 0:
−b˜
[
²(am`²m + af `
²
f )
−2am`²−1m d`m + ²(am`
²
m + af `
²
f )
−2af `²−1f d`f
]
as`
²−1
s
+b˜(²− 1) (am`²m + af `²f)−1 as`²−2s d`s = χ(1− τ`)esdws, ∀s. (42)
Using (41), we obtain,
− ² am`
²
m
am`²m + af `²f
d`m
`m
− ² af `
²
f
am`²m + af `²f
d`f
`f
− (1− ²)d`s
`s
=
dws
ws
, ∀s ∈ {m, f}. (43)
Finally, substituting dwf/wf = 0 for (43) and solving for
d`m/`m
dwm/wm
, we obtain the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply for males,
φm ≡ d`m/`m
dwm/wm
∣∣∣∣
dwf=dχ=0
= −
(
1 +
²
1− ²
af `
²
f
am`²m + af `²f
)
. (44)
Appendix D.3.1 Calibration Forms
Couple Household: We solve the following equation for ² numerically:
(44) : φm = −
(
1 +
²
1− ²
af `
²
f
am`²m + af `²f
)
,
where 1/φm is set to the value of two used by many macroeconomic studies. am and af are computed
using
FOC of hMm/hMf : am =
wmem
wfef
(
1−hM,m−hN,m
1−hM,f−hN,f
)1−²
1 + wmemwfef
(
1−hM,m−hN,m
1−hM,f−hN,f
)1−² ,
af = 1− am.
b˜ is obtained from
FOC of hMm : b˜ =
ξgη−1
ξgη + (1− ξ)[zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
1− τ`
1 + τc
wmem
am`
²
m + af `
²
f
am`
²−1
m
.
The other parameters are computed in the same manner as in the benchmark case.
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Appendix D.3.2 Simulation Algorithm
In Step 3 of the simultaneous equation of the algorithm presented in section Appendix D.2.4, replace
the FOC of hMm and hMf with
(1− ξ)
Φ
[zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
−1
zme
ρ
mh
ρ−1
N,m = b˜
am`
²−1
m
am`²m + af `²f
(1− ξ)
Φ
[zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
−1
zfe
ρ
fh
ρ−1
N,f = b˜
af `
²−1
f
am`²m + af `²f
,
and replace the utility with
U =
{
ln[H(·)] + b˜ ln
(
[am(1− hM,m − hN,m)² + af (1− hM,f − hN,f )²]
1
²
)}
.
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V ar(CF )
V ar(Data)V ar Corr(Data,CF )
Data 0.076 — —
Independent Experiments
– Technology Choice Am/Af 0.026 0.346 0.840
– Effort zs 0.002 0.022 0.289
– Skill es 0.020 0.270 0.359
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.009 0.125 0.958
– Tax τ`, τc 0.000 0.001 0.527
– Population N, N∗s 0.001 0.011 -0.624
Conditional Experiments of Technology Choice Am/Af
– Effort zs 0.032 0.423 0.797
– Skill es 0.039 0.510 0.929
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.068 0.893 0.927
– Tax τ`, τc 0.018 0.243 0.854
– Population N, N∗s 0.021 0.274 0.798
– Effort & Preference zs, αs, α∗s 0.075 0.987 0.905
– Skill & Preference es, αs, α∗s 0.084 1.111 0.966
Table 1: Counterfactual Experiments: Wage Gap Variation
Notes: “Independent Experiments” refers to the effect of independently setting the simulated exogenous variables in
cross-country variations by comparing the individual variable to calculate variance and correlation. “Conditional
Experiments of Technology Choice Am = Af” refers to the effect of several combinations that all include technology
choice. Other exogenous variables and parameters are set to be equivalent to the U.S.-calibrated values. The second
column from the left indicates the variance between each sample country by data and counterfactual simulations,
respectively. The third column calculates the variance ratio of the data and counterfactual simulation that is defined
as the second column of each row divided by the second column of the first row. The fourth column calculates the
correlation between the data and simulation results.
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V ar(CF )
V ar(Data)V ar Corr(Data,CF )
Data 0.032 — —
Independent Experiments
– Technology Choice Am/Af 0.007 0.228 0.329
– Effort zs 0.001 0.017 -0.714
– Skill es 0.015 0.478 -0.164
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.007 0.216 0.242
– Tax τ`, τc 0.000 0.000 -0.008
– Population N, N∗s 0.000 0.008 -0.780
Conditional Experiments of Technology Choice Am/Af
– Effort zs 0.010 0.299 0.127
– Skill es 0.026 0.808 0.089
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.026 0.807 0.286
– Tax τ`, τc 0.005 0.158 0.372
– Population N, N∗s 0.006 0.187 0.256
– Effort & Preference zs, αs, α∗s 0.032 0.973 0.186
– Skill & Preference es, αs, α∗s 0.038 1.184 0.198
Table 2: Counterfactual Experiments: Time Gap Variation of Single Households
Notes: “Independent Experiments” refers to the effect of independently setting the simulated exogenous variables in
cross-country variations by comparing the individual variable to calculate variance and correlation. “Conditional
Experiments of Technology Choice Am = Af” refers to the effect of several combinations that all include technology
choice. Other exogenous variables and parameters are set to be equivalent to the U.S.-calibrated values. The second
column from the left indicates the variance between each sample country by data and counterfactual simulations,
respectively. The third column calculates the variance ratio of the data and counterfactual simulation that is defined
as the second column of each row divided by the second column of the first row. The fourth column calculates the
correlation between the data and simulation results.
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V ar(CF )
V ar(Data)V ar Corr(Data,CF )
Data 0.059 — —
Independent Experiments
– Technology Choice Am/Af 0.029 0.491 -0.240
– Effort zs 0.175 2.942 0.887
– Skill es 0.006 0.099 -0.263
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.013 0.220 -0.111
– Tax τ`, τc 0.000 0.002 -0.168
– Population N, N∗s 0.001 0.019 -0.494
Conditional Experiments of Technology Choice Am/Af
– Effort zs 0.090 1.514 0.964
– Skill es 0.039 0.654 -0.275
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.079 1.325 -0.249
– Tax τ`, τc 0.021 0.359 -0.208
– Population N, N∗s 0.024 0.406 -0.302
– Effort & Preference zs, αs, α∗s 0.068 1.144 0.984
– Skill & Preference es, αs, α∗s 0.080 1.349 -0.275
Table 3: Counterfactual Experiments: Time Gap Variation of Couple Households
Notes: “Independent Experiments” refers to the effect of independently setting the simulated exogenous variables in
cross-country variations by comparing the individual variable to calculate variance and correlation. “Conditional
Experiments of Technology Choice Am = Af” refers to the effect of several combinations that all include technology
choice. Other exogenous variables and parameters are set to be equivalent to the U.S.-calibrated values. The second
column from the left indicates the variance between each sample country by data and counterfactual simulations,
respectively. The third column calculates the variance ratio of the data and counterfactual simulation that is defined
as the second column of each row divided by the second column of the first row. The fourth column calculates the
correlation between the data and simulation results.
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V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.35 0.27 0.12 1.11 0.51 0.89
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.23 0.36 0.09 0.95 0.51 0.60
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.53 0.56 0.34 1.03 0.70 0.87
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.69 0.70 0.23 1.07 0.89 1.05
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.37 0.24 0.13 1.14 0.51 0.96
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.32 0.31 0.11 1.07 0.52 0.81
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.27 0.09 0.19 1.13 0.44 0.92
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.44 0.39 0.10 1.09 0.55 0.93
corr(Data, CF ) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.84 0.36 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.93
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.84 0.36 0.95 0.91 0.85 0.93
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.84 0.35 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.93
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.84 0.35 0.85 0.92 0.89 0.89
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.84 0.36 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.93
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.84 0.36 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.93
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.93 0.37 0.96 0.95 0.87 0.98
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.75 0.35 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.87
Table 4: Robustness Analysis of Wage Gap Variation
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V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.49 0.10 0.22 1.35 0.65 1.32
4.1: Endogenous effort 1.58 1.37 0.69 7.38 3.96 4.41
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 1.29 1.24 0.97 2.84 2.01 2.27
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 1.67 0.96 0.02 2.58 2.12 0.26
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.61 0.21 0.43
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 1.26 0.90 0.60 4.83 2.60 3.56
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.39 0.32 0.35 1.20 0.49 1.59
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.63 0.03 0.17 1.43 0.75 1.38
corr(Data, CF ) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline -0.24 -0.26 -0.11 -0.28 -0.28 -0.25
4.1: Endogenous effort -0.22 -0.36 -0.13 -0.22 -0.25 -0.25
4.1 + 4.2: With capital -0.25 -0.36 -0.16 -0.24 -0.27 -0.28
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. -0.26 -0.33 0.27 -0.22 -0.25 0.42
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 -0.24 0.20 -0.10 -0.17 -0.13 -0.23
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 -0.25 -0.33 -0.13 -0.25 -0.27 -0.27
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 -0.11 -0.29 -0.13 -0.25 -0.23 -0.19
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 -0.28 -0.25 -0.10 -0.29 -0.30 -0.27
Table 5: Robustness Analysis of Time Gap Variation of Couple Households
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V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.23 0.48 0.22 1.18 0.81 0.81
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.17 0.39 0.18 0.93 0.64 0.63
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.53 0.62 0.59 1.16 0.87 1.07
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.67 0.48 0.44 1.10 0.88 1.17
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.24 0.51 0.23 1.27 0.86 0.85
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.21 0.44 0.20 1.08 0.74 0.74
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.17 0.73 0.30 1.08 0.71 0.92
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.29 0.37 0.18 1.23 0.86 0.81
corr(Data,CF ) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.33 -0.16 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.29
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.39 -0.16 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.32
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.33 -0.16 0.28 0.27 0.13 0.31
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.33 -0.15 0.36 0.31 0.21 0.35
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.33 -0.17 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.29
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.33 -0.16 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.29
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.38 -0.17 0.24 0.21 0.08 0.27
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.28 -0.16 0.24 0.19 0.09 0.27
Table 6: Robustness Analysis of Time Gap Variation of Single Households
Country Survey Years
Austria 1992
Germany 1991-92, 2001-02
Italy 2002-03
Netherlands 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005
Spain 2002-03
United Kingdom 1995, 2000-01, 2005
United States 1992-94 , 2003
Table 7: MTUS: Countries and Survey Years
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Variable Name Variable Label Variable Name Variable Label
AV1 Paid work AV21 Walking
AV2 Paid work at home AV22 Religious activities
AV3 Paid work, second job AV23 Civic activities
AV4 School, classes AV24 Cinema or theatre
AV5 Travel to/from work AV25 Dances or parties
AV6 Cook, wash up AV26 Social clubs
AV7 Housework AV27 Pubs
AV8 Odd jobs AV28 Restaurants
AV9 Gardening AV29 Visit friends at their homes
AV10 Shopping AV30 Listen to radio
AV11 Childcare AV31 Watch television or video
AV12 Domestic travel AV32 Listen to records, tapes, cds
AV13 Dress/personal care AV33 Study, homework
AV14 Consume personal services AV34 Read books
AV15 Meals and snacks AV35 Read papers, magazines
AV16 Sleep AV36 Relax
AV17 Free time travel AV37 Conversation
AV18 Excursions AV38 Entertain friends at home
AV19 Active sports participation AV39 Knit, sew
AV20 Passive sports participation AV40 Other leisure
AV41 Unclassified or missing
Table 8: Definition of harmonized activities in MTUS
Variable MTUS Variables
Market Work AV1, AV2, AV3, AV5
Home Production AV6, AV7, AV8, AV9, AV10
Leisure All the others
Table 9: Definition of time allocation for market work, home production, and leisure
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Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Austria
hMm 696 0.357 0.157 0.010 0.573
hMf 696 0.327 0.244 0.042 0.573
hNm 696 0.048 0.074 0.000 0.396
hNf 696 0.142 0.093 0.000 0.365
Germany
hMm 1767 0.334 0.157 0.003 0.580
hMf 1767 0.317 0.277 0.035 0.580
hNm 1767 0.070 0.078 0.000 0.368
hNf 1767 0.107 0.090 0.000 0.309
Italy
hMm 368 0.343 0.140 0.063 0.576
hMf 368 0.300 0.236 0.139 0.549
hNm 368 0.042 0.054 0.000 0.319
hNf 368 0.119 0.088 0.000 0.264
Netherlands
hMm 2855 0.358 0.160 0.010 0.573
hMf 2855 0.234 0.212 0.010 0.542
hNm 2855 0.052 0.066 0.000 0.396
hNf 2855 0.118 0.107 0.000 0.354
Spain
hMm 1016 0.356 0.155 0.014 0.569
hMf 1016 0.331 0.270 0.014 0.576
hNm 1016 0.048 0.061 0.000 0.438
hNf 1016 0.106 0.081 0.000 0.271
United Kingdom
hMm 963 0.335 0.169 0.014 0.576
hMf 963 0.320 0.253 0.007 0.552
hNm 963 0.055 0.069 0.000 0.431
hNf 963 0.071 0.046 0.000 0.365
United States
hMm 2474 0.348 0.166 0.003 0.580
hMf 2474 0.333 0.308 0.007 0.580
hNm 2474 0.052 0.077 0.000 0.417
hNf 2474 0.069 0.059 0.000 0.299
Table 10: Basic Statistics (Couples)
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Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Austria
h∗M,m 269 0.355 0.174 0.021 0.552
h∗M,f 269 0.338 0.118 0.073 0.573
h∗N,m 269 0.067 0.086 0.000 0.406
h∗N,f 269 0.097 0.078 0.000 0.365
Germany
h∗M,m 676 0.345 0.163 0.007 0.576
h∗M,f 676 0.329 0.168 0.014 0.569
h∗N,m 676 0.062 0.060 0.000 0.326
h∗N,f 676 0.088 0.076 0.000 0.347
Italy
h∗M,m 179 0.338 0.187 0.132 0.569
h∗M,f 179 0.304 0.024 0.014 0.542
h∗N,m 179 0.053 0.056 0.000 0.292
h∗N,f 179 0.092 0.044 0.000 0.243
Netherlands
h∗M,m 1815 0.345 0.194 0.010 0.573
h∗M,f 1815 0.309 0.013 0.010 0.573
h∗N,m 1815 0.057 0.062 0.000 0.365
h∗N,f 1815 0.077 0.051 0.000 0.281
Spain
h∗M,m 282 0.324 0.169 0.014 0.576
h∗M,f 282 0.313 0.127 0.007 0.576
h∗N,m 282 0.063 0.062 0.000 0.368
h∗N,f 282 0.098 0.034 0.000 0.340
United Kingdom
h∗M,m 507 0.337 0.197 0.007 0.569
h∗M,f 507 0.295 0.032 0.007 0.573
h∗N,m 507 0.056 0.069 0.000 0.361
h∗N,f 507 0.077 0.054 0.000 0.438
United States
h∗M,m 2002 0.352 0.181 0.001 0.578
h∗M,f 2002 0.335 0.122 0.002 0.580
h∗N,m 2002 0.052 0.077 0.000 0.410
h∗N,f 2002 0.066 0.069 0.000 0.451
Table 11: Basic Statistics (Singles)
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Austria Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Spain UK US
Lm/Lf 1.37 1.04 0.69 2.49 2.49 1.39 1.12 1.40
Lf 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07
Lm 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10
N 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.34
N∗f 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.18
N∗m 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.14
em/ef 1.43 1.11 0.69 1.77 1.88 1.37 1.09 1.45
ef 0.41 0.48 0.59 0.36 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.41
em 0.59 0.52 0.41 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.59
h∗M,m/h
∗
M,f 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.23 1.12 1.04 1.14 1.05
h∗M,f 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.34
h∗M,m 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.35
h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f 0.68 0.70 0.58 0.22 0.75 0.65 0.72 0.79
h∗N,f 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07
h∗N,m 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
hM,m/hM,f 1.09 1.05 1.14 1.30 1.53 1.08 1.05 1.05
hM,f 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.33
hM,m 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.35
hN,m/hN,f 0.34 0.65 0.36 0.07 0.44 0.46 0.77 0.79
hN,f 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07
hN,m 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
τc 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.07
τ` 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.25 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.21
wm/wf 0.77 1.46 1.30 0.96 0.65 0.93 1.45 0.99
wf 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.29 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.24
wm 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.24
wmem/(wfef ) 1.11 1.62 0.90 1.69 1.22 1.28 1.58 1.44
y 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Table 12: Data
Data : N, N, N∗s , τc, τ`, ws, hM,s, h∗M,s, hN,s, h∗N,s, ∀s ∈ {m, f}
Exogenous parameters : σ, ρ, η, γs, γ∗s , ∀s ∈ {m, f}
Calibrated parameters : As, B, ω, α∗s, αs, υ, ξ, ξ∗s , zs, υ, cs, c∗s, g, g∗s , T, ∀s ∈ {m, f}
Table 13: Variable list
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
dlog(Am/Af ) 322 -0.031 0.047 -0.290 0.099
dlog(Lm/Lf ) 322 -0.024 0.040 -0.304 0.103
Table 14: Descriptive statistics
Variables dlog
(
Am
Af
)
dlog(Lm/Lf ) 0.866***
(0.047)
Observations 322
Adjusted R2 0.69
Implied Parameter (ω) 1.12
Notes: The table presents the results from fixed-effect panel regressions. Standard errors are indicated in
parentheses. *** denotes a result that is significant at the 1% level.
Table 15: Estimation Results
Parameter Value Description
1/(1− η) 2.00 EOS b/w g and hN,s
γs = γ∗s , s ∈ {m, f} 0.90 the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of leisure
ω 1.12 firm production technology frontier curvature
1/(1− ρ) 2.00 EOS b/w hN,m and hN,f
1/(1− σ) 2.10 EOS b/w Lm and Lf
ωH 3.00 home production technology frontier curvature
Note: EOS =
elasticity of substitution
Table 16: Exogenous parameters
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Austria Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Spain UK US
Am/Af 0.82 2.15 1.19 2.11 1.00 1.18 2.26 1.34
Af 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.11
Am 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.15
B 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.20
α∗f 0.57 0.58 0.52 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.47
α∗m 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.41 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.45
αf 0.61 0.66 0.52 0.59 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.55
αm 0.52 0.43 0.55 0.26 0.48 0.44 0.37 0.36
c∗f 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.37
c∗m 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.45 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.43
cf 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
cm 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
g 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08
g∗f 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
g∗m 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05
υ 0.75 1.54 1.34 0.97 0.62 0.93 1.53 1.00
ξ 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.82
ξ∗f 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.87
ξ∗m 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.88
zf 0.65 0.45 0.61 0.75 0.63 0.58 0.43 0.48
zm 0.35 0.55 0.39 0.25 0.37 0.42 0.57 0.52
υH 0.42 1.82 0.84 0.33 0.38 0.69 1.93 1.06
BH 0.16 0.33 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.34 0.26
Table 17: Calibrated parameters: Endogenous Productivity of Home Production Model
Austria Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Spain UK US
k 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.28 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.14
θ 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.44 0.35 0.39 0.28 0.36
τk 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.31 0.27
Table 18: Capital stock data
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